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 Transboundary ‘hydro-hegemony’, ten years later 
 
Abstract  
 
 
The article places the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony in the context of the scholarship on 
transboundary water conflict and cooperation. We discuss critiques, developments and debates in this 
domain over the past 10 years, in particular focusing on the ‘London school’ contributions, showing how 
thinking on the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony – and hydropolitics – has moved beyond the 
state-centricity, the tendency to see hegemony as solely negative and the conceptually hegemonic potential 
of hydro-hegemony itself. Various strands of International Relations theory – Realism, neo-institutionalism, 
critical theory – have left their mark on the ‘school’. Intense interaction between analysts and pragmatic 
practitioners is also found to invite [or incite!] eclecticism, as well as to promote vibrancy.  
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Introduction: The Evolution of Hydro-Hegemony Analysis and its Criticisms 
 
Ever since Naff and Matson (2) and Starr and Stoll (3) proclaimed international water wars, violent open 
conflict over water has preoccupied politicians, journalists and academics. Amidst researchers and scholars, 
transboundary water conflict potential quickly turned into a ‘numbers game’ (4) seeking to predict war over 
water with the help of increasingly sophisticated datasets (5,6,7). Allan’s early claim that the water wars 
thesis was alarmist and unfounded gained grudging acceptance (63). Wolf (9) showed that there has not been 
a conflict over water only since Nebuchadnezar sought control over the Mesopotamian Tigris and Euphrates 
and pointed out the overriding evidence of thousands of water treaties concluded since. The 1990s saw a 
shift within the scholarship from fears of water wars to upbeat expectations of co-operation between states 
over water, a ‘reflexive modernisation’ narrative epitomised by Ohlsson and Turton (10). This article 
examines scholarly trends in the theorisation and analysis of hydro-hegemony against this backdrop.  
 
The London Water Research Group (LWRG or London Group) originated in the University of London’s 
School of Oriental and African Studies at the turn of the millennium. The core group was largely composed 
of students and colleagues of Professor John Anthony (Tony) Allan, a key advocate for recognising the 
central role of politics in water issues, particularly in arid regions. At that time, . The London Group quickly 
spotted a missing component in mainstream approaches: a robust understanding and deployment of ‘power’ 
as an analytical tool. To address the gap, they developed the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony1. 
 
The present contribution sketches developments, critiques, and ways forward beyond hegemonic concepts as 
seen by representatives from the London Group that launched it. To structure an overview of the debate and 
to point at next steps in this new domain, the article addresses and accommodates criticism levelled at the 
theoretical framework and analysis of hydro-hegemony. The article considers three main areas of critique: 
state centricity and territorial traps (including the role of institutions and the agency of non-hegemons and 
non-state actors); assumptions of negativity and the immutability of (hydro-)hegemony; and the potential for 
hydro-hegemony itself to be a hegemonic concept.  The development of the theoretical Framework was 
significant as it challenged the then ideologically dominant school of thought in water resources governance 
focusing on management.  
‘Politics’, the London group argued,.was not 'the problem’ standing in the way of proper water management 
(1); rather, ignoring the political  unduly put some actors at a disadvantage. The Framework of Hydro-
Hegemony extended and refined these critiques, emphasising the importance of power in transboundary river 
basin relations. 
 
The LWRG argued that the trending confidence in ‘cooperation’, even if well-intended, did not necessarily 
warrant or lead to peaceful and benign outcomes (17). Cooperation may be forced rather than voluntary, 
sabres may be rattled but not used, and treaties may never go beyond exchange of technical data. Moreover, 
conflictive relations between states are often not about merely water but instead compounded with other 
issues such as state legitimacy, personality clashes, access to other resources and historic grievances (the 
‘shadow of the past’) (12). Water can act as a convenient, highly visible arena for escalating these issues. 
Perhaps the most challenging argument put forward by the London Group was that the presence of 
international organisations and of signatures under a treaty do not guarantee cooperative behaviour (13), and 
so are not accurately counted as ‘cooperative events’ in quantitative studies. Structural conflict may well 
underlie these relations and may sporadically come to the surface.  
 
The preliminary conceptual framework laid down by Zeitoun and Warner (14) and its companion piece on 
counter-hegemony (15) sought to uncover the political context in which water is contested as well as the 
various strategies and tactics used to secure and control water allocation.  Subsequent work utilised power 
analysis (primarily that of Lukes, a topic we will return to) in order to develop a framework focusing on how 
conflict and cooperation co-exist, rejecting static dichotomies of conflict or cooperation occurring in river 
basins (16). 
                                                        
1 
   Warner coined the term ‘hydro-hegemony’ in his 1992 MSc thesis, but only really elaborated on the concept 
through his interactions with the London group. 
 
These studies brought transboundary water interaction centre stage in analysis, offering an alternative 
understanding to work simplifying hydropolitical realities as embodying either conflict or cooperation (17, 
18, 19). This alternative approach enables a better understanding of transboundary water interactions by 
moving from simplistic, dichotomous claims assuming that ‘the next war will be about water’ or ‘water 
scarcity leads to peace’ to more fully examining situations characterised by neither militarised conflict nor 
friendly relations. This does not hold for all basins: some are not conflictive, and even when there is 
(potential) conflict, water resources may not become politicised (20). But there are plenty of shared 
watercourses where conflict is seen and simplifications of causal outcomes of water management cannot be 
made. These basins, the London Group asserts, are best served by analysis that places power asymmetry and 
hegemony at its core. 
 
Hydro-hegemony analysis did not fall out of thin air. The role of power asymmetries and resistance to power 
play in transboundary basins had been dealt with before, e.g. in Lowi (21) and Shapland (22). Its more 
hidden, discreet operation, however, including at the discursive level, was relatively new. Applying different 
theoretical forms of power to transboundary water analysis was first performed by Marwa Daoudy (88). 
Building on this, hydro-hegemony analyses looked into the effects of hard and soft power in maintaining the 
status quo of water allocation, frequently referring to Lukes’ (23) three faces of power: decision-making 
power (the power to ‘win the game’), non-decision-making power (the power to set the agenda), and 
ideological power (control over discourse) along with derivatives.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we address critiques of the theorisation and analysis of hydro-hegemony from 
a variety of sources. The LWRG purposefully borrows from and builds on multiple scholarly traditions and 
understandings of hegemony, considering both radical and neo-institutional perspectives. Rather than 
rejecting various critiques out of hand, and all too aware of the problems arising from unquestioned 
adherence to any school of thought, the London Group has constructively engaged with the critiques while 
also holding to the crucial belief that power and politics is key to understanding transboundary water 
arrangements. In showing the hard (infrastructural) and soft power associated with such prescriptions in 
transboundary water management, hydro-hegemony analysts open up hegemonic concepts for closer scrutiny 
to see what they do. The London Group has always benefited from dialogue between academics and 
practitioners in its conferences, adopting and engaging with the same discourses it seeks to critique. The 
London Group, then, is no exception to the policy and practitioner groups under analysis: we ourselves 
continuously risk getting caught up in hegemonic discourse and practice (see 35). However, our intent is to 
continue providing alternative perspectives and seek ways of reflecting on and engaging with water 
management practices in a way that is sensitive to the implications of power asymmetries. 
 
Building on a discussion paper prepared for one of the London Group’s semi-annual international meetings 
(35), this section considers three primary critiques levelled at the LWRG and Framework of Hydro-
Hegemony: issues of state-centricity and the territorial trap of the river basin as the scalar unit; the prevailing 
conceptualisation of hydro-hegemony as immutable and inherently negative; and the possibility that hydro-
hegemony may itself become hegemonic as a concept, drowning out other issues in and approaches to 
transboundary water interactions. These criticisms challenge the analysis of hydro-hegemony, and by 
extension much hydropolitical analysis, to be more explicit about its theoretical assumptions and 
understandings of hegemony. The critiques have helped the notion of power-laden transboundary water 
interaction advance several steps by addressing common issues in hydropolitics literature, including a narrow 
understandings of territorial space and simplistic approaches to international political economy. 
 
Issue 1: State-centricity and the Territorial Trap  
 
As Furlong (36) has pointedly noted, much hydropolitical, and indeed hydro-hegemony analysis has fallen 
prey to the territorial trap – ‘the reification of sovereignty as complete state control over a fixed unit of 
territorial space; the severing of domestic and foreign politics; and the state as prior to and a container of 
society’ (37). In the early scholarship on water wars, conflict was tantamount to conflict over (i) river basins, 
meted out between (ii) sovereign states and conflicts were parsed as (iii) zero-sum. As we will show below, 
these critiques have been addressed through the development of the hydro-hegemony scholarship.  
 
Most hydro-hegemony analyses have concerned contested river basins, shared by neighbouring states. This 
ontology easily reinforces the dominant role of the state as a main and monolithic actor, responsible for and 
in control of the territorial space of the river. Such an assumption risks missing out the fact that the state’s 
decision do not necessarily represents the interests of all within it (38), and that state control may well be 
contested. The framework of hydro-hegemony has fallen into this trap in which the river basin was the 
hegemonic, taken-for-granted scale of analysis, along with scholarship on water governance on Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) and stakeholder participation often bound by these same units (28). 
Usual suspects for hydropolitical analysis have been the transboundary rivers Jordan, Euphrates and Nile, as 
well as the Orange-Senqu and Mekong. Authors like Lebel et al (39) however showed that the Mekong has 
plenty ungoverned spaces and counterhegemonic practices, while South Sudan on the Nile and Syria and 
Iraq on the Euphrates and Tigris are obviously ill-fitting examples of undivided states in control of water 
representing the population along neatly delineated geographical borders. 
 
Before the theorization of hydro-hegemony, there had been attempts to break through river centricity of the 
water conflict literature by zooming in on transboundary aquifers (22). Since then, there have been notable 
exceptions to the river basin focus combing hydro-hegemony analysis: Ferragina and Greco’s (40) work on 
the politics of the Disi aquifer, shared by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and Messerschmid (41) on the aquifers 
shared by Israel and Palestine and Gomez (42) on the Guarani aquifer shared by Brazil and its neighbours. 
Menga (20) focused on the hegemonic politics of the Aral Sea region in Central Asia. However, much of this 
literature reverts to viewing the role of the state and analysis is bound up in how the state legitimises its 
actions. While the study of aquifers has opened up scope for analysis, these studies have yet to change fully 
the fundamental treatment of space and state agency.   
 
 Given its focus on the river basin as its original unit of analysis, and its origins in international relations 
theory, it is no surprise that hydro-hegemony too has been critiqued as state-centric. But while its origins 
have contributed to the problem, they may also present part of the solution. Hydro-hegemony has from the 
start been an eclectic theoretical mix, in which different (meta)theoretical strands can easily be identified – 
and perhaps leveraged to move beyond simplistic understandings of the state or a particular territory. 
Realism and neo-institutionalism are important directions that are mixed and matched. In Realist thought, 
hegemonic power is tied to a particular state calling the shots or acting as a ‘balancer’ in a region or in the 
world. Neo-institutionalism sees institutional engineering and complex interdependence as ways to overcome 
hegemony. Critical theory sees a global, neoliberal elite calling the shots though the debate on whether states 
are handmaidens of business is still unresolved (51a). Hydro-hegemony analysis has evolved along several 
lines and also sought to take on board critiques of myopic hydropolitics. Varying interpretations of hydro-
hegemony, rather than being a limitation to the body of work given the corresponding lack of singular 
definition, demonstrate disciplinary assumptions in how order, structure and agency are understood. Making 
use of the interdisciplinarity of hydro-hegemony analysis provides a potential way forward. 
 
Within international relations, the theory of hegemonic stability (52) bestows hegemonic power ‘with 
leadership responsibilities and privileges’ (53). Non-hegemons may seek to counterbalance rather than fight 
hegemonic power to make sure no power becomes overweening. The resulting de-facto ‘arrangement’ 
between hegemons and non-hegemons brings order and stability. From a Realist perspective, hegemons set 
the rules of international relations and maintain the status quo in their constellation, while disgruntled actors 
may oppose the rules or the status quo; Turton and Funke (54) and Daoudy (55) have most clearly 
represented this Realist strand. While Realism is mostly focused on military power and violent conflict, some 
Realists consider soft (especialy economic) power as well as hard power necessary to be hegemonic. While 
classical Realists would argue that hegemony is not at work on a basin or regional level but only on the 
global one, neo-Realists scholars identified regional hegemony in regional security complexes (56), a lead 
notably followed by Turton and Funke (54) after Schulz (57).  
 
By treating states as unitary actors, the state centric approach is ‘underpopulated’:  it risks failing to identify 
key actors. ‘Blackboxing’ the state ‘takes preferences for granted’ and negates the way ‘domestic elites’ are 
enmeshed in transnational networks to realise their ambitions (51a). The role of narratives in transboundary 
networks in cementing or resisting hegemony is a development area in hydrohegemony. While the London 
group has incorporated critical theory from the start, its rather loose adaptation of neo-Marxist thought has 
exposed hydro-hegemony to its most trenchant criticism in papers by Selby (58), Davidsen-Harden, Naidoo 
and Harden (59) and Atkins (60). Selby has even claimed that Zeitoun and Warner (14) ‘exclusively’ 
conceptualise HH at the interstate level. While Selby is justified in noting hydro-hegemony analysis is 
essentially Realist in crucial aspects of its London-school conception, we contend that it has moved quite a 
bit beyond that. As hydro-hegemony analysis branched out, state centricity is by no means its key feature.  
 
The state-oriented bias in hydropolitical analysis was further broadened when Sadoff and Grey (43) 
highlighted direct and indirect environmental services related to rivers. The concept of ‘benefit sharing’ (44) 
was reflected in Phillips’ Transboundary Water Opportunity analytical model (45). Recent policy and 
academic debates feature the water-food-energy(-climate change) nexus (46), which address the connections 
and relative interchangeability of environmental services. The development of these analysis is largely 
policy-driven, to seek ‘improved’ water management and avert situations of water scarcity. While such 
policy debates are indeed part of global hegemonic discourses as mentioned above, they also open up 
opportunities for scholarship to demonstrate that the water embedded in tradeable (agro-)commodities  (as 
virtual water) or how kinetic hydro-energy can likewise be commoditized and exchanged. The insights from 
scholarship in turn demonstrate that these policy debates render analysis devoid of politics of the water, its 
services and as commodity, tending to disregard the disbenefits and externalities of collaboration and would 
benefit from any form of politics-sensitive analysis, hydro-hegemonic or otherwise (47). A similar example 
comes from Allouche et al (48), who note that the water-energy-food nexus privileges large structures such 
as dams, which are known to displace people, foster state influence over the hinterland and more recently 
objects of ‘financialisation’ (49)2. Allouche et al (48) also observe that the nexus is framed in security terms: 
an ever expanding menu of (state and human) security concerns imperilling the stable access to resources: 
water security, food security, energy security and climate security were all considered to be in crisis from 
2008. ‘Securitisation’ (50) bestows special powers, bypassing the political process to legitimise 
extraordinary measures. The ‘securitisation of everything’ can then legitimise pre-emptive measures, 
foregoing a deliberative process based on a unfounded belief in the control predictability of risks (51). While 
moving away from zero-sum calculations of water issues is helpful, here we caution against depoliticised 
decision-making, to which analysis of hydro-hegemony scrutinises the discourses and the underpinning 
power that entrenches thinking that is blind to the creation and effects of dis-benefits and externalities. These 
issues help move beyond the river basin as the primary unit of analysis in international water issues. The 
emphasis on trade and big infrastructure legitimised through the water-energy-food nexus also open the door 
to economic organisations and other actors. 
 
Hydro-hegemony analysis has incorporated an understanding that transnational companies and INGOs are 
major actors on the global scene. Cascão (15), for one, shows how non-state actors are instrumentalised by 
domestic elites to further development goals. Warner (61) and Conker (62) highlighted the importance (but 
have not claimed the dominance) of transboundary private and civil-society actors by the example of the 
hegemonic politics of the Ilisu Dam on the river Tigris, to which Turkey is upstream. Mirumachi (16) 
uncovers how the political economy of the basin states propels bilateral and multilateral developments. In 
this they follow neo-realists, such as Keohane and Rosenau, who have such ‘populated’ their analytical 
world with transnational actors, issue regimes, business networks, transnational advocacy groups’, terrorist 
organisations’ have become part of decisional authority (51a).  
 
States can seize on the proliferation of MNCs, Hensengerth argues, to increase their power and actively steer 
networks but require leveraging transboundary networks for this. The logic of government has, in this sense, 
changed. The construction industry, banks and also global activists are key players in understanding the 
transboundary politics of dams, while the international political economy of virtual water put the relations 
between states and markets in agricultural trade centre stage. Public-private elite collusion is identified at the 
state and global level in global virtual water hydro-hegemony (64). The authors note that only five 
transnational companies, Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus and Glencore, or the 
so-called ´ABCDG´, control 80% of global agricultural trade and in so doing the water contained there. Their 
operations are actively supported and facilitated by national governments. From a recognition that ‘issues of 
power and privilege also dictate communities’ access to river basin resources beyond and within states’, a 
distinct scholarship is being built up within the London Group that explores Virtual Water hegemony (e.g. 
64; 35). ‘Virtual water’ is subject to capture through large traders (64), further juxtaposing a divide between 
those who gain benefits from such global trade system and those who merely deal with disbenefits, detached 
                                                        
2 Financialization describes attempts to reduce all value that is exchanged (tangibles or intangibles, future or present 
promises, etc.) into a financial instrument. According to its critics, financialization reduces any work product or service 
to an exchangeable financial instrument, like currency, and thus facilitates to trade in these financial instruments, as 
well as land and water grabbing (65a). 
from ways to seek recourse within this global system. This line of analysis has flirted with a systemic (‘world 
systems’) approach to hegemony, which put core-periphery economic relations centre stage (65a, b). 
 
The focus on the role of transnational actors has also enabled an engagement with political ecologists (66) to 
look at the politicised environment (an early forerunner was Turton (67); also (36). Zeitoun et al. (68) engage 
with current ontological debates in the social sciences that explore how the social and the natural coproduce 
each other in the ‘waterscape’ drawing on the case of the upper Jordan basin. The waterscapes approach 
helps to “explore the ways in which flows of water, power and capital converge to produce uneven socio-
ecological arrangements over space and time, the particular characteristics of which reflect the power 
relations that shaped their production (69). Moreover, the interface with political ecology and hydro-
hegemony analysis has incited a greater emphasis onto (environmental) justice issues as seen in (70), dealing 
with the process and outcomes of structural inequality. 
 
Issue 2: Assumptions of Negativity and Immutability of Hegemonic Power Relations 
 
Negativity  
 
Hydro-hegemony scholarship generally presents hegemony as a fact of life (cf. Moffitt 2009), in which 
actors can only seek to change the nature of hegemony. This may be a problem in some languages and 
cultures than in others, especially in those where ‘hegemony’ has such a negative ring. After all, 
linguistically, hegemony denotes positive leadership qualities, that of a vanguard and guide (hegemon). In 
the original framework of hydro-hegemony, Zeitoun and Warner (14) expressed a reformist rather than 
revisionist or revolutionary belief in the possibility of positive forms of hegemony, parsed as leadership, 
reflecting Realist (Realpolitik) leanings. In a Realist scenario, benign hegemons promote transboundary 
cooperation, taking on the burdens of a hegemon in contributing disproportionately to infrastructure and 
diplomacy that maintain stability of a mostly uncontested transboundary water arrangement. However, in 
contrast, empirical insights are limited on positive cases of hegemony in hydro-hegemony scholarship (35): 
critical scholarship tends to focus on hegemony when it has gone wrong. There is ample scope to research 
not only ‘bad’ leaders and destructive uses of hegemonic power (bullying) but also positive case studies 
(visionary leadership) (see also 71). Students of hydropolitics have expended rather less energy on the 
question why some, if not most, non-hegemons choose to follow the pattern set by the hydro-hegemon, 
whether inspired by opportunism or defeatism. In this regard Haugaard and Lentner (72) point at ‘strategic 
cooperation’. Positive hegemony would be a hegemonic order from which all riparians would benefit: a plus-
sum rather than a zero- or negative sum outcome. Past work of the London School sheds light on how 
compliance is often a resultant outcome in situations of power asymmetry (18). Integrative strategies can be 
seen in the efforts at demonstrating in international fora a normative role of the leadership [cite TBWI 2]. 
However, this is highly contested. An example is the role of the Republic of South Africa in its 
hydropolitical constellation. While Turton and Funke (54) identify South Africa as a benign hegemon, 
promoting the ‘common good’, Furlong (36) arrives at the opposite conclusion from a political ecology 
perspective, claiming South Africa promoting harmful neoliberalism. Sebastian & Warner (73) do not go that 
far, but claim South Africa may well be involved in a ‘water grabbing’ strategy. 
Integrative strategies can be seen in the efforts at demonstrating in international fora a normative role of the 
leadership [cite TBWI 2]. However, this is highly contested. An example is the role of the Republic of South 
Africa in its hydropolitical constellation. While Turton and Funke (54) identify South Africa as a benign 
hegemon, promoting the 'common good', Furlong (36) arrives at the opposite conclusion from a political 
ecology perspective, claiming South Africa promoting harmful neoliberalism. Sebastian & Warner (73) do 
not go that far, but claim South Africa may well be involved in a ‘water grabbing’ strate 
A Stockholm Water Week Session organised in 2006 by the London Group found that neither hegemons nor 
non-hegemons (seen from the Israeli or Jordanian perspectives, respectively) are necessarily pleased with 
their label. Their self-image or preferred public image may be quite different. While the object of study 
doesn’t need to identify with how analysts see them, it should give pause for thought to the analyst about 
more sophisticated labelling. It also reinforces and legitimises the multiplicity of definitions of ‘hegemon’ 
and ‘hydro-hegemon’. There is not one approach to or understanding of hegemony. Within international 
relations, different schools of thought conceptualise it differently. Moving past the bounds of IR scholarship, 
other disciplines and non-academics also use the idea in a variety of ways. Rather than advocating for one 
particular approach as ‘correct’, the London Water Research Group seeks to call attention to these different 
uses and learn from each. 
 
Immutability 
 
While hydro-hegemony may seem determinant in transboundary water politics, it is certainly not a concrete 
state of affairs. The case of the Nile River Basin demonstrates how the downstream hegemonic position of a 
country like Egypt can change after attempts at resisting and challenging the status quo. Moreover, Turkish 
hegemony in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin is incomplete and subject to what Sumer (74) calls ‘corrosive 
forces’. A systematically contested hegemonic project, he implies, may not be seen as a ‘perfect’ hegemony, 
while the Government of Turkey also did not resort to systematic coercion and capture (see also 62). 
However, hydro-hegemony analysis has attempted to explain how non-hegemons may resist hegemons (e.g. 
15). Given the remarkable durability of power relations on rivers over time, the potential of 
counterhegemonic agency of non-hegemons has perhaps not been given enough credence as pointed out in 
the case of Ethiopia by Tawfik (75) and in the case of Bangladesh by Thomas (#).  
This is a useful point as material power dynamics may change, while at the discursive level states may 
actively choose to redefine their status through a new set of strategies and tactics. Cooperation may be 
intentionally declared as a strategic alternative to open conflict. Or a state may choose to develop 
cooperation in parallel with conflict, in which case ‘the different sides’ divergent  interests – their respective 
goals, intentions and guiding principles – are not laid to rest, but merely change their form’ (41). Turkey and 
Syria have been in a process of appeasement since 2001, and Syria even in 2008 declared that ´we have 
always been friends´. This signified a move opposite from the Nilotic turn of events, where the negation of 
any conflict used to be the norm set by Egypt, and veiled consent became open standoff (19). 
 
Hydro-hegemony is thus not and should not be considered inevitable or unchangeable. The potential of 
hydro-hegemony to be intentionally impacted by various actors was discussed further in the most recent of 
the London Water Research Group’s publications. “Transboundary water interaction III: contest and 
compliance” examines and theorises counter-hegemonic strategies in what may otherwise be stagnant 
relations. 
 
Issue 3: Hydro-Hegemony and Hegemonic Concepts 
 
As neo-Gramscians argue, hegemony is different from dominance. Crucial to this is the manufacture of 
‘common sense’ and their spread in key positions in society – or, at a basin scale, in the political 
constellation governing shared waters. This notion has roots in thinking of Italian power theorists such as 
Mosca and Gramsci. While Mosca (24), in his doctrine of the ‘political class’ explained how a small 
minority can maintain power, Gramsci (25) turned this question on its head, asking how a regime can be 
overturned. 
 
The critical perspective tends to see a hegemony of values that may be but need not be linked to a particular 
state, but rather to a ruling elite for a particular global hegemonic project. This elite may create a common 
sense, a dominating political and ideological force that results from a broader geopolitical order in which the 
action or interest of a hegemon may not be required at all:‘where issues have achieved a certain international 
discursive hegemony, the propensity of state actors, be they hegemons or subordinates, to act beyond them 
can be limited’ (38).  
 
Davidsen’s (26a) analysis on hydro-hegemony of Southern Africa however drew on post-Marxist 
interpretations of hegemony along the lines of Laclau & Mouffe.(26). Unlike class struggle taking centre-
stage as in classical Marxist notions, in Laclau & Mouffe’s argument the vitality of fundamental antagonisms 
become drivers of politics. Hegemony in this approach is strongly bound up with fixing meaning. All social 
life consists of meaning, and as meaning can never be fully fixed, it must be constantly reproduced and 
reconstituted (27), there is space for resistance and change, promoting a ‘logic of difference’, hardening 
friend-enemy antagonisms.  
 
Analysis of hydro-hegemony aims to shed light on these seemingly common-sense, partially fixed meanings 
and antagonisms. This is important as the scholarship on hydropolitics is often tied up with policy debates on 
water governance. These debates can demonstrate how hegemonic concepts in the water sector come and 
go.3 A hegemonic project (i.e. a project that seeks to bring a change into a hegemonic order) will “attempt to 
weave together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or structure a field of meaning, thus 
fixing the identities of objects and practices in a particular way” (31, p. 102). For this, discourse plays a key 
role in devising ‘empty signifiers’, like screens onto which actors can project their hopes and fears, around 
which coalitions converge. These empty signifiers are significant not because of their content but their effect 
that brings actors together (32, 33). Policy narratives tend to acquire a life of their own and are not easily 
debunked by contradicting empirical evidence, as “they continue to underwrite and stabilize the 
assumptions” for policymaking “in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization’ (34). Even if 
scientific analysis may indicate otherwise, narratives tend to be persistent and resilient because they are 
appealing, simple and draw on common sense (30). The scholarship on hydro-hegemony attempts to 
examine and moreover challenge these narratives and supposed common-sense approaches to water 
management.     
 
As discussed in the Introduction, the ‘water wars’ rationale  was for many years a hegemonic ‘common-
sense’ concept (4). This rationale was successfully countered by another ‘common sense’ idea of water peace 
and cooperation. Hydro-hegemony has, in turn, countered the cooperation claim. If this upward march 
continues, ironically, (hydro)hegemony itself may become a hegemonic concept. Chase-Dunn et al (71) 
warned against this type of dynamic in 1994, and now its application to hydro-hegemony is in danger of 
‘becoming one of those common academic words that is thrown around too much, used to refer to too many 
things without clear definition or focus’ (35). Participants in the London Water Research Group’s 
International Workhops on Hydro-Hegemony have regularly requested clarification on what is meant by the 
use of the term hegemony – with no definitive answer given. Analysts may be tempted to see hegemony 
everywhere, making the term shorthand for ‘power exercise we don’t like’. 
 
Is the scholarship on hydro-hegemony too obsessed with hegemony and hegemonic powers?  Duarte Lopes 
(78) thinks so, and has critiqued the hydro-hegemony framework for under-estimating the power of 
interdependence, institutions and integration. Her liberal-institutionalist critique of HH argues states can 
work together perfectly well without hegemonic politics. They can decide it is in their best interests to 
establish common rules impinging on their sovereignty. She takes relations between Spain and Portugal as an 
example, where the European Union fostered a greener, IWRM-based value system enabling collaboration. 
Non-hegemonic states may try to influence rules through their participation in international institutions (18, 
cf 79). However, this piece of work also draws on the state-centric legacy of hegemonic analysis. A more 
nuanced explanation drawing on the role of institutions beyond state borders is found in the adaptive water 
governance literature. Pahl-Wöstl et al (80: p. 422) define global water governance as “the development and 
implementation of norms, principles, rules, incentives, informative tools, and infrastructure to promote a 
change in the behavio[u]r of actors at the global level in the area of water governance”. These aspects can be 
underpinned by empirical observations such as even within the durable stability of the European Union, 
however, riparian neighbours can run into intense diplomatic arguments in which the non-hegemon, such as 
Belgium on the river Scheldt, invoked historic grievances against the Netherlands (83; 84). As normative 
agreement expands, the coercion aspect becomes less important, as hegemons become leaders moulding 
multilateral institutions in their image.  
 
There are certainly numerous examples where water is not conflictive and politicised because there is plenty 
for all, or where it is not clear-cut who the hegemon is (Central Asia,  see Wegerich 2008). Where water 
relations and allocative arrangements are disputed, this liberal-institutionalist body of work sees potential for 
‘breaking hegemony’. A situation with no hegemony, referred to as ‘a-hegemony’, a situation of power-free 
‘authentic deliberation’, remains a theoretical possibility the London group has so far not displayed much 
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   (Regional or global) ‘development’ is a particularly powerful ‘empty signifier’. The currently 
hegemonic liberal imagination sees human development as an ever upward-pointing arrow of enlightenment. This 
requires conceptual attractors, which of necessity display asymptotic tendencies towards integration such as with 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM became a globally hegemonic movement, together with 
Multi-stakeholder participation and the river basin level (28,29), currently replaced by Adaptive Management and the 
Nexus. Like any ‘empty signifier’ or Nirvana Concept, as coined by Molle (30), it is not very clear what IWRM actually 
entails. Yet, it is translated into prescriptive policies, so that now even authoritarian regimes such as Myanmar now 
claim to have participatory, integrated river basin plans.  
 
affinity with. It is certainly helpful to allow for multiple voices, creating a pluralism of knowledge fora and 
demonstrating a deliberative kind of politics to 'level the playing field'.  We also need to remind ourselves 
now and then that the mere fact of writing about hegemony risks making it bigger, reifying it and turning it 
into a monster. An alternative option would be to ‘decentre’ it, to ignore it and focus on alternative spaces. 
We would argue however that there is an elephant in the room that won’t go away once we stop obsessing 
over it (92).  
 
The absence of a hegemon, after all, is not the same as ‘absence of hegemony’. A hegemonic order can be 
maintained despite a decline of overt hegemony (52), and hegemony can be decoupled from specific 
hegemons. The reverse of that coin implies that it does not take the emergence of a new hegemon for a 
hegemonic order to change 
.  
 
From neo-institutionalist literature, we accept the importance of organisational factors such as procedural 
rules and the creation of specialised institutions that can correct for (but also reinforce) power asymmetries. 
But participation and organisation are not limited to the planned and designed types preferred in the neo-
institutional literature. A coherent alliance and agenda however surely help reinforce or upset the ruling 
common sense, as they allow or negate alternative norms and discourse becoming sanctioned. 
  
Alliances may organise for or against hegemonic order and sediment into institutions. After Newell (82) and 
Mukhtarov and Cherp (29), we can see organisation (institutional power) as a third key factor next to 
discursive and material power in upholding or eroding hegemony. The organisational factors shed light on 
the ways an alternative norm could become accepted. Social movements such as water protest movements 
based on an alternative identity can push open doors (81). 
 
From a critical/radical perspective, counter-hegemonies may be identified challenging the ‘common sense’ 
wrested in international academic and trade fora, a global counterhegemonic movement briefly alluded to by 
Zeitoun & Warner4. While Mukhtarov and Cherp (29) focus on the rise of Integrated Water Resource 
Management as a hegemonic discourse, Atkins (60) even argues ‘neoliberalism’, as in the idea that water is 
an economic rather than a social good, is the hegemonic power at the global level. ‘Water as an economic 
good’ brings individuation and legalisation of water rights, seen as a commons by its opponents (85). In 
Palestine, the hegemonic idea of ‘water as an economic good’ supported the PA’s trial of pre-paid water 
meters in the West Bank, for example, even as the 2002 Palestine Water Law defined water as a public good. 
The resultant system stabilised the water supply for some but worsened the most vulnerable groups’ existing 
insecurity (86). Such conditions create overlapping hydro-hegemonies, as the water security of marginalised 
Palestinians is threatened by both Israeli occupation and the Palestinian Authority’s interest in World Bank 
investments and international trade development – a stranglehold very well described in Selby (89). 
 
Another arena of contested global hydro-hegemony that comes to mind, in line with Atkins, are the World 
Water Forums of 2009 (Istanbul) and Mexico (2012). Bazaar-like triennial mega-gatherings bring together 
public, private, multilateral and civil-society actors from all over the world and are primary loci for 
cementing new catchwords and orthodoxies (61). At the fifth WWF 2009 in Istanbul, a widely varied 
Turkish and international coalition contesting water liberalisation gathered in an alternative Water Forum to 
discuss issues and their strategy, in part drawing on the London Group. The subsequent World Water Forum 
in Mexico was shaken by assertive voices from Andean countries denouncing the promotion of privatisation 
and deregulation. In doing so, they juxtaposed Andean Identity vs. neo-liberalism, promoting indigenous 
values. The potential for Andean identity to be an alternative political force was spearheaded by Bolivian 
President Evo Morales, previously co-opted by the United Nations as protector of the Andes. It promoted a 
wholly different ontology (a conception of ‘what is’), postulating a symmetry between human and nonhuman 
actors. This resonated with a Western obsession of looking for authentic values and created an unexpected 
counterhegemonic alliance (87). Alternative ‘memes’ such as buen vivir and Pachamama, and the claim that 
water is sacred, were bandied about with scant regard to the finer points of the Andean cosmology or the 
                                                        
4 “There are a number of critical scholars representing this non- or counter-hegemonic perspective – in the 
manner of feminists exposing male hegemony; thinkers from developing nations taking issue with “western” neo-liberal 
hegemony; bottom-up environmental and anti-globalisation activists and others (..) Just as the mainstream discourse 
deﬁned by the hegemons may go unchallenged, however, discourse that resists hegemony runs the risk of being self-
referential, like a mutual back-slapping society” (14, p. 440) 
rather contradictory practice in Bolivia and Ecuador, where traditional collective use and rapacious water 
resource development go hand in hand. Many researchers, consultants and policymakers present at the 
Forum probably found it hard to identify with neoliberal values. Still, the image stuck and made the global 
headlines, to the palpable annoyance of World Water Council dignitaries. They found themselves in the 
‘wrong’ corner of the arena in an agonic ‘friend-enemy’ pairing. Since then, the Andean counterhegemonic 
coalition has remained a force to be reckoned with. Hydro-hegemony scholars can learn from these examples 
to continue pushing against dominant discourses and widen the scope of work.  
 
 
Conclusion: The Last Ten Years, the Next Ten Years 
 
Ten years of writings on hydro-hegemony have brought fundamental shifts and major expansions in thinking 
around transboundary water interactions. A microcosm of the progress of hydropolitical literature in general, 
hydro-hegemony analysis has broadened its scope beyond the river basin, the state and negative connotations 
of hydro-hegemony. It has found its place as an alternative conception of transboundary water relations in a 
wide range of water-related literature, such as the normally optimistic writings on water diplomacy (11), and 
the normally pessimistic writings of critical geography. It has successfully contributed to both scholarship 
and policy debates to moving the perspective from ‘water wars’ to less visible water conflict and political 
strife, which may flare up in ‘water riots’ but often stays latent. Thanks to interdisciplinary dialogues within 
and outside the academic and nonacademic world, those engaged with hydro-hegemony analysis have not 
laid doctrines and instead benefited from the eclecticism brought about by cross-disciplinary and cross-sector 
fertilisation of ideas.  
 
As a result, this alternative concept of transboundary water relations does not follow a neat or consistent 
progression from one paradigm to another. The engagement with multiple strands of international relations, 
political ecology and international political economy (particularly its neo-institutionalist version) has refined 
the scope and focus of hydro-hegemony analysis, continuing to demonstrate its relevance and contribution to 
the evolution of hydropolitics literature in general. The issue of scale in hydro-hegemony continues to 
require attention, and there is outstanding work to be done sharpening analysis on what is and what is not 
hegemony so as to avoid labelling every power difference as hegemony. Properly responding to critiques of 
the London Group and extant hydro-hegemony scholarship calls for a wider examination into agency, 
institutions and processes. Ten years after the introduction of the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, 
considerable progress has been made – and considerably more work is yet to be done. Addressing these 
issues, and expanding the extent of empirical work directly tied to hydro-hegemony analysis, should be at the 
forefront of the hydropolitical scholarship agenda for the next ten years. 
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